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The efficient certification of classically intractable quantum devices has been a central research ques-
tion for some time. However, to observe a “quantum advantage”, it is believed that one does not
need to build a large scale universal quantum computer, a task which has proven extremely challeng-
ing. Intermediate quantum models that are easier to implement, but which also exhibit this quantum
advantage over classical computers, have been proposed. In this work, we present a certification
technique for such a sub-universal quantum server which only performs commuting gates and re-
quires very limited quantum memory. By allowing a verifying client to manipulate single qubits, we
exploit properties of measurement based blind quantum computing to give them the tools to test the
“quantum superiority” of the server.
1 Introduction
Quantum computers are believed to be able to efficiently simulate quantum systems [15, 19] and outper-
form classical systems for specific tasks. Examples include Shor’s algorithm for prime factorisation [37],
Grover’s algorithm for unstructured search [20], and the BB84 [5] and Ekert91 [14] protocols for public
key exchange. That said, it may be some time before a large scale universal quantum computer capable
of demonstrating the computational power of these protocols is built. In the meantime, several inter-
mediate, non-universal models of quantum computation, which are still believed to not be classically
simulatable, may prove easier to implement. Examples include the one clean qubit model [25, 28], the
boson sampling model [1, 18, 30] and the Ising model [17, 29]. The Instantaneous Quantum Poly-time
(IQP) machine [36] is another such non-universal model with significant practical advantages [2,6]. IQP
uses only commuting gates but is believed to remain hard to classically simulate [6–8] even in a noisy
environment [6, 9]. Providing evidence that a machine can perform hard IQP computations would be a
proof of quantum superiority [33] before a universal quantum computer has been realised experimentally.
In [36], the authors present a hypothesis test which can be passed only by devices capable of per-
forming hard IQP computations. In order to accommodate a purely classical client, computational as-
sumptions (conjecturing the hardness of finding hidden sub-matroids) are required in order to prove
quantum superiority. In the present work, by endowing the client with the ability to perform simple
qubit manipulations similar to those used in Quantum Key Distribution schemes [5], we develop an
information-theoretically secure hypothesis test for IQP.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce the IQP machine
and provide an implementation in Measurement Based Quantum Computing (MBQC) [34, 35] which is
more suitable for proving security in our framework than previous ones [22,36]. In Section 3 we use tools
from blind quantum computing [10,16] to derive a delegated protocol for IQP computations which keeps
the details of the computation hidden from the device performing it. We prove information-theoretical
security of that scheme in a composable framework. Finally, in Section 4 we develop a hypothesis test
that a limited quantum client can run to certify the quantum superiority of an untrusted Server.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 X-programs
The IQP machine introduced in [36] is defined by its capacity to implement X -programs.
Definition 2.1. An X -program consists of a Hamiltonian comprised of a sum of products of X operators
on different qubits, and θ ∈ [0,2pi] describing the time for which it is applied. The hth term of the sum
has a corresponding vector qh ∈ {0,1}np , called a program element, which defines on which of the np
input qubits, the product of X operators which constitute that term, acts. The vector qh has 1 in the j-th
position when X is applied on the j-th qubit.
As such, we can describe the X-program using θ and the matrix Q= (Qh j) ∈ {0,1}na×np which has
as rows the program elements qh, h= 1, . . . ,na.
Applying the X -program discussed above to the computational basis state |0np〉 and measuring the
result in the computational basis can also be viewed as a quantum circuit with input |0np〉, comprised of
gates diagonal in the Pauli-X basis, and classical output. Using the random variable X to represent the
distribution of output samples, the probability distribution of outcomes x˜ ∈ {0,1}np is:
P(X= x˜) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣〈x˜|exp
 na∑
h=1
iθ
⊗
j:Qh j=1
X j
 |0np〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(1)
Definition 2.2. Given some X-program, an IQP machine is any computational method capable of effi-
ciently returning a sample x˜ ∈ {0,1}np from the probability distribution (1).
2.2 IQP In MBQC
A common framework for studying quantum computation is the MBQCmodel [34,35], where a quantum
operation is expressed by a set of measurement angles on an entangled state described by a graph. This
entangled state is built by applying a controlled-Z operation between qubits when there is an edge in the
corresponding graph. The probabilistic nature of the measurements of the qubits in this state introduces
some randomness which may be corrected for by adjusting the angle of measurement of subsequent
qubits depending on the outcomes of the already performed measurements. The entangling, measuring
and correcting operations on a set of qubits are usually referred to as a measurement pattern [11, 12].
In this work, we will deal with a specific type of graphs, given in the following definition:
Definition 2.3. We define the IQP graph of an X-program (Q,θ), as the graph with biadjacency matrix
Q = (Qh j) ∈ {0,1}na×np . This means that there is a bipartition of vertices into two sets P and A of
cardinality np and na and that an edge exists in the graph between vertex ah of set A and vertex p j of set
P when Qh j = 1.
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a1 a2
p1 p2 p3
Q=
(
1 0 1
0 1 0
)
Figure 1: An example of an IQP graph described by matrixQ. Here, np = 3 and na = 2 while the partition
used is P= [p1, p2, p3] and A= [a1,a2].
In what follows, we will denote with Q both the matrix of the X -program and its corresponding IQP
graph (see Figure 1 for an example). The sets of vertices A= {a1, ...,ana} and P=
{
p1, ..., pnp
}
will be
called primary and ancillary vertices respectively. A result which is vital to the remainder of this paper,
is the following:
Lemma 2.1. A measurement pattern can always be designed to simulate an X-program efficiently.
One can prove [27] that the distribution of (1) may be achieved by initialising np primary qubits in the
states
∣∣p j〉= |+〉, na ancillary qubits in the states |ah〉= |+〉, applying Controlled-Z operations between
qubits when there is an edge in the IQP graph described by the X -program matrix Q and measuring the
resulting state. We form this proof by demonstrating that sampling from the distribution in equation (1)
is equivalent to inputting the primary qubits into a circuit made from composing circuits like the one
in Figure 2 (one for each term of the sum in equation (1)) and measuring the result in the Hadamard
basis. We then argue that all measurements may be delayed to the end of the composed circuit while the
ancillary measurement basis is:
{|0θ 〉 , |1θ 〉}=
{
1√
2
(
e−iθ |+〉+ eiθ |−〉
)
,
1√
2
(
e−iθ |+〉− eiθ |−〉
)}
(2)
p˜1
...
p˜#h
p˜#h+1
...
p˜np
|+〉
. . .
Z
...
Z
Figure 2: The circuit implementing one term in the sum of equation (1). The input qubits {p j}npj=1 are
rearranged so that if #h is the Hamming weight of row h of matrix Q, then for k = 1, . . . ,#h each p˜k
corresponds to one p j such that Qh j = 1 and for k = #h+1, . . . ,np they correspond to the ones such that
Qh j = 0. The ancillary qubit measurement is in the basis {|0θ 〉 , |1θ 〉} defined in expression (2).
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3 Blind Delegated IQP Computation
We now move to build a method for blindly performing an IQP computation in a delegated setting. We
consider a client with limited quantum power delegating an IQP computation to a powerful Server. The
novel method that we use in this work is to keep the X -program secret by concealing the quantum state
used. Intuitively, this is done by the client asking the Server to produce a quite general quantum state
and then ‘move’ from that one to the one that is required for the computation. If this is done in a blind
way then the Server only has knowledge of the general starting state from which any number of other
quantum states may have been built. Hence, there are three key problems to be addressed:
1. How to transform one state to another.
2. Which general quantum state to build and transform into the one required for the IQP computation.
3. How to do this transformation secretly in a delegated setting.
3.1 Break and Bridge
The break and bridge operations [16,21] on a graph G˜= (V˜ , E˜), with vertex set V˜ and edge set E˜ describe
the operations necessary to solve problem 1.
Definition 3.1. The break operator acts on a vertex v ∈ V˜ of degree 2 in a graph G˜. It removes v from V˜
and also removes any edges connected to v from E˜.
The bridge operator also acts on v ∈ V˜ of degree 2 in a graph G˜. It removes v from V˜ , removes edges
connected to v from E˜ and adds an edge between the neighbours of v.
Figure 3: An example of a sequence of one bridge and one break operation.
Figure 3 gives an example of multiple applications of the bridge and break operators. We will now
define the general states required to solve problem 2.
Definition 3.2. An extended IQP graph is represented by Q˜ ∈ {−1,0,1}na×np . The vertex set contains
A= {a1, ...,ana} and P=
{
p1, ..., pnp
}
while Q˜h j = 0 and Q˜h j = 1 denote if there is a connection or not
between vertices ah and p j in the same way as for the IQP graph of Definition 2.3.
We interpret Q˜h j = −1 as the existence of an intermediary vertex bk between vertices p j and ah,
and denote with nb the number of -1s in Q˜. The vertex set includes the bridge and break vertices B =
{b1, ...,bnb} and the edge set includes edges between bk and ah as well as between bk and p j when
Q˜h j = −1. We define a surjective function g for which g(h, j) = k when bk is the intermediate vertex
connected to ah and p j.
An extended IQP graph Q˜ can be built from an IQP graph Q by replacing any number of the entries
of Q with −1. Throughout the remainder of this work we will use tilde notation to represent an extended
IQP graph Q˜ build from an IQP graph Q in this way. Figure 4 displays an example of an extended IQP
graph. By applying a bridge operator to b1 and a break operation to b2 in Q˜ of Figure 4 we arrive at Q of
Figure 1. It is in this sense that an extended IQP graph is ‘more general’ that an IQP graph.
To solve our three problems we must translate these graph theoretic ideas into operations on quantum
states. The following definition allows us to use graphs defined above to describe entanglement patterns.
D.Mills, A.Pappa, T.Kapourniotis & E.Kashefi 213
a1 a2
p1
b1
p2 p3
b2
Q˜=
( −1 0 1
0 1 −1
)
Figure 4: An extended IQP graph described by Q˜with (na,np,nb)= (2,3,2), P= [p1, p2, p3], B= [b1,b2]
and A = [a1,a2]. Two vertices b1 and b2 are introduced and the function g : Zna×np → Znb is defined as
g(1,1) = 1 and g(2,3) = 2.
Definition 3.3. Consider the extended IQP graph Q˜ ∈ {−1,0,1}na×np and use function g(h, j) = k to
define indices k = 1, . . . ,nb for the elements Q˜h j = −1. The circuit EQ˜ on (na+ np+ nb) qubits applies
controlled-Z operations between qubits p j and ah if Q˜h j = 1 and, between qubits bg(h, j) and ah, and,
bg(h, j) and p j, when Q˜h j =−1.
Now we reformulate a lemma from [16] in order to translate bridge and break operations from graph
theoretical ideas into operations on quantum states.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a quantum state EQ |φ〉 where |φ〉 is arbitrary. If Q˜ is an extended IQP graph
built fromQ then there exists a state E
Q˜
|ψ〉, which can be transformed into the state EQ |φ〉 through a se-
quence of Pauli-Y basis measurements on qubits and local rotations around the Z axis on the unmeasured
qubits through angles
{
0, pi
2
,pi, 3pi
2
}
.
The detailed proof of Lemma 3.1 [27] shows us that we can create the following state where p j and
ah are the primary and ancillary qubits connected to bk (i.e. g(h, j) = k), r
b and db are strings described
later in Algorithm 1 and sbk is the outcome of a measurement on qubit bk.
nb
∏
k=1
(
S
(−1)sbk+rbk
p j ⊗S(−1)
sb
k
+rb
k
ah
)dbk (
Z
rbk
p j ⊗Zr
b
k
a j
)1−dbk
EQ |φ〉 (3)
To achieve this we make measurements of the qubits corresponding to bridge and break vertices
(which we call bridge and break qubits and which are initialised as |bk〉 = Y rbk
√
Y
dbk |0〉) in E
Q˜
|ψ〉 in
the Pauli Y basis. Using this method, we generate the state in Lemma 2.1 (i.e. EQ
⊗na+np
1 |+〉) up to S
corrections, which can be accounted for by correcting the primary and ancillary measurement bases.
3.2 Blindness
To address problem 3, we wish to construct the Ideal Resource of Figure 5 which takes as input from
the client an IQP computation (Q,θ), and in return gives a classical output x˜. If the Server is honest,
x˜ comes from the distribution corresponding to (Q,θ). If the Server is dishonest, they can input some
quantum operation E and some quantum state ρB and force the output to the client into the classical
state E (Q,θ ,ρB). We assume that the following are public knowledge: an extended IQP graph Q˜, the
distribution Q over the possible Qs from which Q˜ could be built, and θ . It is important to note that
neither Q, nor anything besides that which we have specified as public, is revealed to the Server.
Blindness is added to the work of Section 3.1 by performing random rotations when initialising the
primary and ancillary qubits. These are corrected by rotating the measurement bases of those qubits,
therefore ensuring the original IQP computation is performed. Intuitively, this randomness provides
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x˜=
{
x if honest
E (Q,ρB,θ) if dishonest
S
Q
x˜
E
ρB
Q˜,Q,θ
Figure 5: The ideal blind delegated IQP computation resource.
piA
Q
x˜
ρ
sb
A,Π
sa,sp
piB
E
ρB
ρ ′B
Q˜,Q,θ
R
Figure 6: The real communication protocol. piA is the set of operation performed by the client, piB are
those of the Server and R is the communication channel (quantum and classical) used by the client and
the Server in the protocol. Details of the communication protocol R can be seen in Algorithm 1.
blindness as it hides the previous corrections shown in equation (3), which would otherwise give away
if a bridge or break operation was applied to a neighbour. Our communication protocol can be seen in
Algorithm 1 and is summarised in Figure 6.
To prove composable security of the proposed protocol we drop the notion of a malicious Server for
that of a global distinguisher which has a view of all inputs and outputs of the relevant resources. To
be able to compare the ideal resource with the real communication protocol, we develop a simulator σ
interfacing between the ideal resource S of Figure 5 and the distinguisher such that the latter cannot
tell the difference between an interaction with the ideal resource and the real protocol. We employ the
Abstract Cryptography framework introduced in [26, 32] and teleportation techniques inspired by [13]
to prove security in the case of a malicious Server. If piA is protocol run by the Client and R is the
communication channel between them and the Server, then we can prove [27] that:
piAR ≡S σ (10)
where equality here means the two protocols are indistinguishable.
Theorem 3.1. The communication protocol described by Algorithm 1 is information theoretically secure
against a dishonest Server.
We can now be sure that our communication protocol is indistinguishable from an ideal resource
which performs an IQP computation without communicating any information to the Server which is not
already public. This is proven in a composable framework [13, 32] and so can be used as part of future
protocols, as we will do in section 4.
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Algorithm 1 Blind distributed IQP computation
Public: Q˜,Q, θ
client input: Q
client output: x˜
Protocol:
1: The client randomly generates rp,dp ∈{0,1}np and ra,da ∈ {0,1}na where np and na are the numbers
of primary and ancillary qubits respectively.
2: The client generates the states
∣∣p j〉 = Zrpj Sdpj |+〉 and |ah〉 = ZrahSdah |+〉 for j ∈ {1, . . . ,np} and h ∈
{1, . . . ,na}.
3: The client creates db ∈ {0,1}nb in the following way: For h= 1, . . . ,na and j= 1, . . . ,np, if Q˜h j =−1
and Qh j = 0, then d
b
k = 0 else if Q˜h j =−1 and Qh j = 1 then dbk = 1. He keeps track of the relation
between k and (h, j) via the surjective function g : Zna×np → Znb .
4: The client generates rb ∈ {0,1}nb at random and produces the states |bk〉 = Y rbk
(√
Y
)dbk |0〉 for k ∈
{1, . . . ,nb}.
5: The state ρ , comprising of all of the client’s produced states, is sent to the Server.
6: The Server implements E
Q˜
.
7: The Server measures qubits b1, . . . ,bnb in the Y -basis
{∣∣+Y〉 , ∣∣−Y〉} and sends the outcome sb ∈
{0,1}nb to the client.
8: The client calculates Πz,Πs ∈ {0,1}np and Az,As ∈ {0,1}na using equations (4), (5), (6) and (7).
Πzj = ∑
h,k:g(h, j)=k
rbk
(
1−dbk
)
− rpj (4)
Πsj = ∑
h,k:g(h, j)=k
(−1)sbk+rbkdbk −dpj (5)
Azh = ∑
j,k:g(h, j)=k
rbk
(
1−dbk
)
− rah (6)
Ash = ∑
j,k:g(h, j)=k
(−1)sbk+rbkdbk −dah (7)
9: The client sends, to the serve, A ∈ {0,1,2,3}na and Π ∈ {0,1,2,3}np for the ancillary and primary
qubits respectively, where Ah = A
s
h+2A
z
h (mod 4) and Π j = Π
s
j+2Π
z
j (mod 4).
10: The Server measures the respective qubits in the basis below for the ancillary and primary qubits
respectively.
S−Ah {|0θ 〉 , |1θ 〉} and S−Π j {|+〉 , |−〉} (8)
11: The measurement outcomes sp ∈ {0,1}np and sa ∈ {0,1}na are sent to the client.
12: The client generates and outputs x˜ ∈ {0,1}np as follows.
x˜ j = s
p
j + ∑
h:Qh j=1
sah (mod 2) (9)
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4 The Hypothesis Test
4.1 Previous work
The general idea of our Hypothesis Test, building on the work of [36], is that there is some hidden struc-
ture in the program elements, qh, of the X -program, which results in some structure in the distribution
of the outputs, known only to the client. The client can use this structure to check the Server’s reply.
A Server possessing an IQP machine can reproduce this structure by implementing the X -program. A
Server not in possession of an IQP machine, cannot generate outputs obeying the same rules. We sum-
marise this discussion by three conditions that a hypothesis test using this method must meet.
1.1 A client asks a Server to perform a hard-to-classically-simulate IQP computation.
1.2 The client can check the solution to this computation because they know some secret structure that
makes this checking process efficient.
1.3 The Server must be unable to uncover this structure in polynomial time.
The particular ‘known structure’ of the output used in [36] to satisfy 1.2 is its bias.
Definition 4.1. If X is a random variable taking values in {0,1}np and s∈ {0,1}np then the bias of X in the
direction s is P
(
X · sT = 0) where the product is performed modulo 2. Hence, the bias of a distribution
in the direction s is the probability of a sample from the distribution being orthogonal to s.
To calculate the bias of X in direction s ∈ {0,1}n, we form the linear code Cs by selecting all rows,
qh, of the X -program, (Q,θ) ∈ {0,1}na×np × [0,2pi], such that qh · sT = 1. We form, from them, the
matrix, Qs, which is set as the generator matrix of Cs. Defining ns as the number of rows of Qs and #c as
the hamming weight of c allows us to understand the following expression derived in [36].
P
(
X · sT = 0)= Ec∼Cs [cos2 (θ (ns−2 ·#c))] (11)
Hence, the bias of an X -program in the direction s depends only on θ and the linear code defined
by the generator matrix Qs. One can now imagine a hypothesis test derived from this. Although the X -
program to be implemented needs to be made public, the direction swhich will be used for checking, will
be kept secret. This gives a client, with the computational power to calculate the quantity of expression
(11), the necessary information to compute the bias, but does not afford the Server the same privilege.
What we want to show is that the only way for the Server to produce an output with the correct bias
is to use an IQP machine. If the Server could uncover s then they could calculate the value of expression
(11) and return vectors to the client which are orthogonal to s with the correct probability. We specialise
the conditions mentioned at the beginning of this section to this particular method.
2.1 The X -Program sent to a Server represents an IQP computation that is hard to classically simulate.
2.2 It must be possible for a client, having knowledge of a secret s and the X -program, to calculate the
quantity of expression (11).
2.3 The knowledge of the Server must be insufficient to learn the value of s.
In [36] the authors develop a protocol for building an X -program and a vector s performing this
type of hypothesis test. The code Cs used is a quadratic residue code with θ =
pi
8
and condition 2.1
is conjectured to be satisfied by X -program matrices generating this code space. This conjecture is
supported by giving a classical simulation that is believed to be optimal and achieves maximum bias
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value 0.75, lower than that expected from an IQP machine. Condition 2.2 is satisfied in [36], by explicitly
calculating the bias value to be cos2
(
pi
8
)
for their choice of X -program and s.
The way in which condition 2.3 is addressed in [36] relies on the fact that the right-hand side of
equation (11) is equal for all generator matrices in a matroid [31].
Definition 4.2. A h-point binary matroid is an equivalence class of matrices with h rows, defined over
F2. Two matrices, M1 and M2, are said to be equivalent if, for some permutation matrix R, the column
echelon reduced form ofM1 is the same as the column echelon reduced form of R ·M2 (In the case where
the column dimensions do not match, we define equivalence by deleting columns containing only 0s after
column echelon reduction).
Consider right-multiplying the matrix A on Q where A is chosen so that QA belongs to the same
matroid asQ. Notice that qhs
′T = (qhA)
(
A−1s′T
)
and so rows originally non-orthogonal to s′T are now
non-orthogonal to A−1s′T . Hence, we can locate the matroid Qs′ in the matrix QA by using A−1s′
T
. We
now understand what to do to the Q describing the X -program we are considering, so that we remain in
the same matroid, and hence prevent the bias from changing, if we perform operations on s′.
To hide the full description of Q, use instead Q′, built by adding additional random rows orthogonal
to s′, which do not affect the value of the bias. The combination of matrix randomisation, and the the fact
that they do not know Q′, makes it hard, as conjectured in [36], up to some computational complexity
assumptions, for the Server to recover A−1s′T if they are given Q′A, even when they know s′ and Q. It is
now a matter for the Server to implement the X -program Q′A and for the client to check the bias of the
output in the hidden direction sT =A−1s′T . This is the idea behind the approach used by [36] to address
condition 2.3.
4.2 Our Protocol
The main contribution of this work is to revisit condition 2.3.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 2 presents an information-theoretically secure solution to condition 2.3.
In Algorithm 2 we provide a hypothesis test that uses Algorithm 1 to verify quantum superiority. By
using the blind IQP computation resource of Section 3.2 we have solved condition 2.3 but do so now
with information theoretic security as opposed to the reliance on computational complexity assumptions
used by [36]. This is true because the Server learns only the distribution Q over the possible set of
graphs Q. By setting Q = QsA, Algorithm 2 develops a bijection mapping ŝ ∈ {0,1}np−1 to a unique
matrix Q ∈ {0,1}na×np . So Q is equivalent to the distribution from which ŝ is drawn. In this case it is
the uniform distribution over a set of size 2np−1. In particular the server does not learn s as is required by
condition 2.3. Notice that Algorithm 2 should be repeated to accurately check the bias is cos2
(
pi
8
)
as we
would expect from the quantum case.
5 Discussion, Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a new certification technique for IQP machines which can be run by a client able to
prepare single-qubit Pauli eigenstates. By giving the client minimal quantum abilities we can remove
computational restrictions placed on the Server in previous work [36] and, instead, prove information-
theoretical security against an untrusted Server.
There are several advantages of using this tailored verification protocol for IQP computations, rather
than a straightforward verification in a universal quantum computing model [16, 24]. The latter requires
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Algorithm 2 Our hypothesis test protocol
Input: na prime such that na+1 is a multiple of 8.
client output: o ∈ {0,1}
Protocol:
1: Set np =
na+1
2
2: Take the quadratic residue code generator matrix Qr ∈ {0,1}na×(np−1)
3: Let Qs ∈ {0,1}na×np be Qr with a column of ones appended to the last column.
4: Pick ŝ ∈ {0,1}np−1 chosen uniformly at random.
5: Define the matrix A ∈ {0,1}np×np according to equation (12).
Ah, j =

1 if h= j
0 if h 6= j and j < np
ŝh if j = np and h< np
(12)
6: Set Q=QsA and θ =
pi
8
.
7: Set Q˜ to be the matrix Qr with a column of −1 appended.
8: Set Q to be the uniform distribution over all possible Q for different ŝ.
9: Perform IQP computation Q using Algorithm 1 with inputs Q, Q˜, Q and θ and outputs x˜ and ρ ′B.
10: Let s′ ∈ {0,1}np be the vector with entries all equal to zero with the exception of the last which is set
to one.
11: Test the orthogonality of the output x˜ against sT = A−1s′T setting o = 0 if it is not orthogonal and
o= 1 if it is orthogonal.
higher precision in the manipulation of single qubits from the client (use of states other than single-qubit
Pauli eigenstates) and significantly more quantum communication and processing for the verification
technique. Although the qubit consumption is still, as in this work, linear in the size of the computation,
in early machines the constant factor will likely be important. Further, asking a Server to perform an IQP
computation using a model that is universal for quantum computation would require the Server to create
large cluster states and perform measurement that might lie far beyond its IQP capabilities.
IQP circuits are important as they may prove easier to implement experimentally compared to uni-
versal quantum computers. Due to the commutativity of the gates it is theoretically possible to perform
an IQP computation in one round of measurements. Our protocol requires a two-round MBQC computa-
tion which we believe is not a significant additional requirement, given the implementation requirements
of universal quantum computation. We therefore believe that our scheme will be implementable in the
near future, for a small number of qubits, and so a future avenue of research would be to study this
hypothesis test protocol under realistic experimental errors, following similar examples of work in this
direction [9, 23].
The demand for the Server to have memory to support a two-round MBQC computation means ma-
chines capable of passing the original test of [36] might not be able to pass that of this work. These studies
do not restrict the architectures that the Server can use, which comes at the high cost of placing compu-
tational restrictions on the Server [36]. Our requirement that the Server can perform two-round MBQC
allows us to achieve information-theoretical security. Finally, given that Gaussian quantum subtheory
can be seen as a continuous variable analogue of the stabiliser formalism [3, 4, 38], a natural extension
would be a continuous variable analogue of our protocol where the client prepares only Gaussian states.
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